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Introduction
This paper is built on a theoretical foundation that draws close
connections between rhetoric and technology. These relationships
go beyond the observation that Aristotle considered rhetoric to be a
technê (art) (Arist. Rhet. 1.1.). Rather, rhetoric and technology are
similar in the fact that both do things in the world. I am specifically
interested in how rhetoric and technology both rely on and
potentially contribute to what can be seen as ‘common sense.’ In the
pages that follow, I investigate several sites of change between
classical and modern rhetoric, focusing on differences involving the
concept of common sense (endoxa) in Aristotle. I argue that there
are loci of change that mark the shift from the classical sense of
endoxa as a rhetorical device to the recognition made by many
modern rhetoricians that the truth is largely what we make of it.
It is worth noting at the outset that this clear-cut distinction
between classical and modern rhetoric rests on somewhat shaky
ground, as Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede make clear (Lunsford and
Ede 1984). Lunsford and Ede cast doubt upon a commonly accepted
dichotomy between classical (and especially Aristotelian) rhetoric
and the modern rhetoric that began to emerge in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries and came into its own in the twentieth
(Lunsford and Ede 1984, 37-40). As Lunsford and Ede describe it,
this dichotomy has rested on the notion that Aristotle viewed man
as an animal motivated by reason, antagonistic only in his desire to
persuade his audience. By way of contrast, modern rhetoric has
been characterized by viewing people as symbol-using animals,

motivated by emotion and psychological proofs, with a rhetoraudience relationship that is aimed at dialog and communication
(40). Lunsford and Ede argue convincingly that this dichotomy
relies on an oversimplified reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric isolated
from his other texts. However, Lunsford and Ede also make clear
that there are several key differences between Aristotle’s rhetoric
and texts that draw from it, such as The New Rhetoric by Chaïm
Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca.
One of these differences is found in the ways these respective
rhetorics rely on epistemology:
Rhetoric uses thought and language to lead to judgment
(krisis) as the basis of action in matters of this world.
And for Aristotle, that world of contingent reality,
though itself in a state of flux, could be understood by
systematic application of the intellect because that
reality itself was thought to be informed by stable first
principles.
Modern rhetorical theory rests on no such fully confident
epistemology, nor does knowledge enjoy such a clearly
defined status. ... Hence, for the modern period,
connections among thought, language, and reality are
thought to be grounded not in an independent, chartable
reality but in the nature of the knower instead (Lunsford
and Ede 1984, 47).
In other words one key difference between Aristotelian and modern
rhetorics is the amount of weight their respective epistemologies
can bear.
Lunsford and Ede go on to note another distinction between
classical and modern rhetoric: Modern rhetoric does not have the
kind of “fully articulated theory” that Aristotle was able to offer in
The Rhetoric. Instead, we rhetoricians of the twentieth and twentyfirst centuries have relied on a multiplicity of theories, each working
to reveal a small piece of the relationships about thought,
knowledge, and language (47). One purpose of this paper is to
investigate how technology factors into these relationships.
As such, I locate five sites of change that help shift from a
classical epistemology to a modern one. 1 These sites of change can
be found in 1) arguments based on loci of quantity, 2)
By “modern” I mean simply a rhetorical system that recognizes the
dependence that knowledge has on the knower, as articulated by Lunsford
and Ede above.
1
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enthymematic arguments, 3) modern understandings of the
relationship between common sense and truth, 4) Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s universal audience, and 5) the philosophical
concept of social imaginaries. My purpose is to tease out differences
among these closely related rhetorical and philosophical concepts
in order to shed light on their normative implications. “Common
sense” influences the ways in which we see ourselves fitting into the
world, as philosopher Charles Taylor points out (Charles Taylor
2002, 2004). Taylor offers the theoretical construct of “social
imaginaries” to help describe the ways in which participants in a
society shape and are shaped by the social structures around them.
Insofar as these interactions are rhetorical, I see them as similar to
the kinds of rhetoric that undergird Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca’s concept of communion but as different in important ways
from Aristotle’s endoxa.
However, technology itself can be profoundly disruptive of
common sense. In the second half of this article, I will demonstrate
how the confrontation between technology and common sense
differs between Aristotle’s rhetorical theory and modern (especially
twentieth century) rhetorical theory. One result of this conflict can
be seen when technological change gives birth to new forms of
common sense. As I will show in the final section below, this
process becomes most clear if technology itself is seen through a
critical lens. Andrew Feenburg’s critical theory of technology offers
just such a lens to focus on this process (Feenburg 2002). However,
I also argue that rhetorical theory provides an opportunity to
deepen the critical theory of technology offered by Feenberg.

Aristotle: Rhetoric, Endoxa, and Truth
Before beginning the main part of this article, it is worth reviewing
some of Aristotle’s fundamental ideas about rhetoric. I begin with
this oft-cited passage from On Rhetoric: “Rhetoric may be defined
as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of
persuasion” (Rhet. 1.2.1355b27-8). Aristotle considered rhetoric to
be related to dialectic. However, it is clear that dialectic served a
much more important role in Aristotle’s mind; it could lead to
knowledge (epistēmē) whereas rhetoric leads to persuasion (pistis).
What’s more, Aristotle makes a distinction between those kinds of
rhetoric that draw on knowledge and those that are based on
opinion: “For argument based on knowledge implies instruction,
and there are people whom one cannot instruct. Here, then, we
must use, as our modes of persuasion and argument, notions
possessed by everybody [that is, endoxa]” (Rhet. 1.1. 1345a26-8).
Later in this article I will discuss the relationship that Aristotle
Joshua Welsh
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sketches out between endoxa and the rhetorical device of
enthymeme. For now it is sufficient to acknowledge that for
Aristotle truth remained well outside the purview of rhetoric even
though enthymeme and endoxa must draw on truth (or what seems
to be true) in order to be persuasive. Thus, for Aristotle dialectic is
an essential methodology that can be drawn on in the hopes of
discovering truths, whereas rhetoric is at best a technique used to
persuade.
Endoxa can be thought of simply as commonly held opinions, as
Aristotle puts it in The Topics:
In the case of scientific principles, there is no need to
seek the answer of why but each of the first principles is
persuasive in and of itself. Generally accepted opinions
[endoxa], on the other hand are those that seem right to
all people or most people or the wise (Arist. Topics
1.1.100b18).
Further, Aristotle sees in humans an innate ability to find endoxa
that are more or less true:
For the true and the approximately true are
apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted
that men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is
true, and usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man
who makes a good guess at the truth is likely to make a
good guess at what is reputable [that is, at endoxa] (Rhet
1.1.1355a14-18).
This makes it clear that although “rhetoric is the counterpart of
dialectic” (Rhet.1.1.1354a1), Aristotle’s vision of rhetoric is largely
concerned with persuasion. At best rhetoric should attempt to rely
on truth to persuade audiences to act in accordance with truth.
Rhetoricians since at least the twentieth century have
found the line between opinion and truth to be much less distinct.
Without going so far as to claim the non-existence of the material
world, theorists such as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca have found
truth to be more the product of human communication and rhetoric
than Aristotle likely would have allowed. Indeed, Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca see their project as taking up this thread: “Here is
resumed the age-old debate between those who stand for truth and
those who stand for opinion, between philosophers seeking the
absolute and rhetors involved in action” (27). This debate in turn
leads them to a “distinction between persuading and convincing”
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 27). In other words, whereas Aristotle saw Truth as something that the rhetorician must lean
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on in order to persuade, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca draw a
close connection between generally held opinion and those things
that are eventually held to be true.

Locus 1: Loci of quantity
Loci of quantity provide the first place to look for a change in the
relationship between rhetoric and the truth found in common
sense. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, loci of
quantity provide a connective tissue binding opinion and truth.
Simply put, an argument resting on a locus of quantity relies on the
power of numbers to be persuasive—that is, something that is good
for many is generally thought to be persuasive to all. Indeed,
Aristotle himself considered loci of quantity in Topics, as Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca point out: “Aristotle mentions some of these
loci: a greater number of good things is more desirable than a
smaller” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 85). Indeed,
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca argue that these kinds of proofs lie
at the heart of many modern notions of self-rule and even what
comes to be counted as “truth” itself:
A locus of quantity, the superiority of that which is
accepted by the greater number of people, forms the
basis of certain conceptions of democracy and also
conceptions of reason which equate reason with
‘common sense.’ Even which certain philosophers such
as Plato contrast truth when the opinion of the greater
number, it is by means of a locus of quantity that they
justify the preference they accord to truth, for they hold
it to be something commanding the assent of all the
gods, something which should win the assent of all men
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 86–7).
Regarding the relationship between loci of quantity and truth,
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca point to the notion of durability
(which is quantitatively based on the amount of time something will
last): “The quantitative locus of durability justifies also the high
values attached to truth as being that which is eternal in contrast to
opinions, which are passing and unstable” (87). Contrast this with
Descartes, who viewed “good sense” as “the power of judging aright
and of distinguishing truth from error” (Descartes 1994, 3).
Descartes saw good sense, or reason, as being distributed in equal
shares among all people. The reason people disagree is not that
some people have more reason than others, but that “We conduct
our thoughts along different ways and do not fix our attention on
the same objects” (Descartes 1994, 3). Implicit in this view of
reason is the assumption that truth itself lies outside of the ways in
Joshua Welsh
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which we reason about it. Some of us may find truth by using
reason well; others may not. But Truth itself is always external to
the seeker.
Unlike Aristotle and Descartes, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
maintain that truth is not external to rhetoric—instead they place
truth directly in the hands of the rhetor. In other words, to be
considered true a thing need only be thought of as true by the
greatest number of people for the greatest amount of time. Rhetors
concerned with opinion are therefore directly involved in crafting
what comes to be held as true. 2
Of course, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca were not the first
scholars to question the notions of an external Truth. To take one
eighteenth-century example, Giambattista Vico critiqued the
Cartesian methods of inquiry that were prevalent in his time,
arguing that an over-reliance on these methods had led to a neglect
of ethics and rhetoric:
Since, in our time, the only target of our intellectual
endeavors is truth, we devote all our efforts to the
investigation of physical phenomena, because their
nature seems unambiguous; but we fail to inquire into
human nature which, because of the freedom of man’s
will, is difficult to determine (Vico 1990, 720).
Vico’s solution, at least for those interested in political topics and
human affairs, was to forgo the study of nature for the study of
debate and rhetoric.
Michel Foucault takes a similar tack in his description of the role
that language plays as part of the epistemic warehouse: “All
knowledge is rooted in a life, a society, and a language that have a
history, and it is in that very history that knowledge finds the
element enabling it to communicate with other forms of life”
(Foucault 1970, 372). According to Foucault, as also Vico,
language’s role in the epistemic warehouse is rooted in custom and
the human mind:
Having become a dense and consistent historical reality,
language forms the locus of tradition, of the unspoken
habits of thought, of what lies hidden in a people’s mind;

This should come as no great surprise to readers of modern rhetoric,
especially work that has been done in the past three decades on the
rhetoric of science. Gross (1990) and Latour & Woolgar (1986) are
excellent examples.
2
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it accumulates an ineluctable memory which does not
even know itself as a memory (Foucault 1970, 297).
Setting aside the Foucauldian mystery of how language could
involve itself in “unspoken habits of thought,” the key insight is
clear. In fact, it is reminiscent of an observation offered by Lewis
Mumford that the mind is something different from the brain, and
quite impossible without language (Mumford 1967, Chapter 2). The
crux of Foucault’s project in The Order of Things is to explain how
rhetorical changes have impacted that epistemic warehouse.
Foucault claims that before the modern era, language and
knowledge were centered on categorizing and taxonomies. Indeed,
Foucault insightfully points out that categories rely on the natural
ambiguity of language, since a perfect one-to-one naming system
would be completely meaningless. In other words, language is not
simply about naming things; language concerns itself with putting
like with like and thereby attempting to understand differences
(Foucault 1970, 96–103). However, Foucault argues that during the
modern era, language (and consequently knowledge) moved from
taxonomies to grids: “The centre of knowledge in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries is in the table” (75). This reflects changes
in writing and even printing technologies; it is easier to
communicate using grids and tables if these devices can be
reproduced consistently. In essence, these rhetorical changes
impact the nature of knowledge itself—changes in language and
writing affect the way that knowledge is discovered, understood,
created, and transferred.

Locus 2: Enthymeme
A second locus of change between ancient and modern rhetoric as
they bear on in the relationship between rhetoric and common
sense can be found in shifting understandings of enthymeme.
Enthymeme, at its core, is a rhetorical argument in which one or
more premises or the conclusion has been left unstated. 3 The
classic example of enthymeme is as follows:

3

Some scholars have rightly cast doubt on this tidy, long-standing
definition. M. F. Burnyeat, for example, argues that Aristotle did not
intend for the definition of enthymeme to be so heavily pinned to
whether premises are explicit or implied. Instead Burnyeat contends that
Aristotle saw enthymeme and rhetorical syllogism—which he
distinguished from the logical syllogism—as much the same thing (as the
citation from Rhet 1.1.1355a shows). The difference between rhetorical
syllogism (or enthymeme) and logical syllogism can be found not in their
nature of their premises but instead in their contexts (Burnyeat 1996,
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1)
2)

Socrates is a man.
Therefore Socrates is mortal.

In this example, the unstated premise is “All men are mortal.”
Aristotle offers the enthymeme as one way to connect arguments
with endoxa:
It is clear, then that the technical study of rhetoric is
concerned with the modes of persuasion. Now
persuasion is sort of demonstration (since we are most
fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been
demonstrated); the orator’s demonstration is an
enthymeme, [and this, in general, the most effective of
the modes of persuasion]; the enthymeme is a sort of
deduction … : clearly, then, he who is best able to see
how and from what elements a deduction is produced
will also be best skilled in the enthymeme, when he has
further learnt what its subject-matter is and in what
respects it differs from the deductions of logic. For the
true and the approximately true are apprehended by the
same faculty; it may also be noted that men have a
sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do
arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good
guess at the truth is likely to make a good guess at what
is reputable (Rhet 1.1.1355a4-18).
For Aristotle, there is a clear relationship between enthymeme and
endoxa: Endoxa are the source of the terms connecting
enthymematic premises and conclusions. However even when
dealing with enthymeme, Aristotle remains focused on truth as the
most important ingredient in persuasion: “True and better ones
[i.e., underlying facts] are by nature always more productive of
good syllogisms [and by extension, good enthymemes] and, in a
word, more persuasive” (Rhetoric 1355a12). Without access to the
truth, the rhetor (as far as Aristotle is concerned) does not have
much hope of being persuasive. In other words, for Aristotle, knowing the truth can help reveal more persuasive enthymemes, but not
the other way around.
Lloyd Bitzer sheds light on the relationship between
commonly held opinion and enthymeme in Aristotle’s Rhetoric
while strengthening the connection between dialectic and rhetoric
itself (Bitzer 1959, 399-408). He surveys previous definitions of enthymeme and finds most of them lacking in one way or another. But
98). Burnyeat makes it clear that rhetorical and dialectic arguments
(whether they be labeled as enthymemes or syllogisms) are both
dependent on endoxa for their premises.
Joshua Welsh
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building from these definitions and from the Rhetoric itself, he
finds that definitions of enthymeme generally see it as something
akin to a syllogism that deals with probabilities or signs while at the
same time leaving some part of the argument unstated. Bitzer
implies in his own definition that it is the unstated portion of the
argument that gives rhetorical enthymeme its persuasive power:
“The enthymeme is a syllogism based on probabilities, signs, and
examples, whose function is rhetorical persuasion. Its successful
construction is accomplished through the joint efforts of speaker
and audience, and this is its essential character” (Bitzer, 1959, 408).
In other words, the unstated premises in an enthymeme are similar
to the questions used in dialectic: both allow the audience to fill in
crucial parts of the interaction based on their own opinions and
beliefs. This has become especially important as rhetoric has moved
from oratory into writing. However, Douglas Walton, far from
seeing this as a strength of enthymeme, considers it to be “the
problem with enthymemes”:
If given carte blanche to fill in any proposition needed to
make the inference structurally correct, we may insert
assumptions…that the speaker or audience didn’t realize
were there, doesn’t accept, or didn’t even mean to be part
of the argument (Walton 2001, 94).
Nevertheless, Walton offers his own description of the way
enthymeme often functions in rhetoric: “In rhetorical persuasion, it
seems that eikotic or plausibilistic arguments are frequently
combined with arguments that have nonexplicit premises or
conclusions” (99).
After analyzing a number of enthymematic arguments, Walton
helps shed light on the connection between enthymeme and eikos
or probability:
A common basis for many of the enthymemes above is
found in propositions that are relied on as acceptable
assumptions that need not be explicitly stated because
they can be taken for granted as holding on the basis of
common experience, or common understanding of the
way things normally work in familiar situations (Walton
2001, 104). 4

As an example, Walton also offers the following argument: “Rise e
bise (rice and peas) is often listed on menus among the soups, and some
gastronomic writers dare to call it one. Nonsense! It is served with a fork.
Who ever heard of eating soup with fork?” (Walton 2001, 102, citing Root
1990). Walton breaks down the enthymeme in this example more quite
4

Joshua Welsh

9

Poroi 10,1 (January 2014)

In other words, enthymemes need not explicitly state those
premises that are anchored in common sense. They are already
there, in the spirit (en-thumos). It is this reliance on common sense
and the relationship between common sense and commonly held
opinion (that is, between enthymeme and endoxa) that interests
me, especially as both concepts become anchored in technological
choices. In the following section, I attempt to make clear some
connections between common sense and rhetorical facts and truths.

Locus 3: Common Sense, Facts, and the Truth
A third place where modernist rhetoric has shifted towards the
epistemic can be found in the relationship among common sense,
facts, and truth. It is just here that technology comes on stage. This
is important to an understanding of how rhetoric in turn shapes
technology because of the tendency that successful technologies
have of becoming ubiquitous—and then invisible. Our understanding of technological progress becomes interwoven with our
understanding of the way things are. Historical choices that have
been made along the way fade into imperceptibility.
An example of technology taking a common sense place in our
lives is my choice of a tool with which to write early versions of this
article. Having grown weary of word processors crashing and
inconsistent formatting of text, I chose the LaTeX markup
language. Several colleagues have told me that I was crazy, since
writing in LaTeX looks more like computer programming than
word processing and would require a heavy learning curve. One
person said, “There is a reason everyone uses Word: It’s better!”
The consensus was that I was defying common sense by forgoing
the ease of writing in a graphical word processor such as Microsoft
Word or OpenOffice (See Figure 1). Below, I outline the basis for
such notions of common sense, arguing that they are essentially
found in rhetorically constructed notions of Truth.

clearly as, “If something is served with a fork, and nobody eats soup with
a fork, then what was served is not a soup” (102).
Joshua Welsh
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Figure 1: The LaTeX markup language for an early version of this article.

As noted above, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecha point to loci of
quantity as the justification given by philosophers since Plato for
their preference for Truth over mere opinion, since Truth is
“something commanding the assent of all the gods, something
which should win the assent of all men” (Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca 1969, 86–7). They base this insightful observation at least in
part on the following passage from Plato’s Phaedrus: “A moderate
man does not put himself through this labor [of constructing
speeches] in order to speak and act in the company of human
beings, but to put himself in a position of saying what is gratifying
to the gods” (273e). However, in the modern world Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca describe an attachment to truth that is
unconditionally bound to the assent of other people, or at least to
any such assent that can be constructed by the rhetor. Note that this
is distinct from Aristotle’s use of dialectic to discover first
principles. In Aristotle’s version, truth exists somewhere, waiting
for men to discover it. For Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, truth is
bound up in how rhetors construct their audiences.
Similarly, rhetoricians have long argued that facts are the
constructions of speakers and writers. Poovey describes the ways in
which the Renaissance innovation of double-entry bookkeeping
helped move the production of knowledge from speaking to writing
(Poovey 1998, 29-91). She argues that the writing of the emerging
mercantile class contributed to a change in what was understood to
be a fact: “Mercantile writing—both double-entry bookkeeping and
mercantile accommodation more generally—played a greater role in
the transition from the old status hierarchy to modern, functionally
differentiated domains than historians have typically
acknowledged” (Poovey 1998, 91). Poovey traces this shift to the
modern reliance on statistics as a tool for understanding the natural
Joshua Welsh
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world. However, she acknowledges that this shift did not come
about without philosophical challenges and difficulties:
As long as one assigned the phenomena of nature—or
even more questionably an abstraction like the economy
or society—the kind of prominence that Bacon had done,
it was impossible to any method except a mathematical
one for moving from observed particulars to general
principles (Poovey 1998, 317, emphasis in original).
Not only are facts drawn from the social and material worlds reliant
on the ways people write about them for their existence, but the
shift from hierarchy and taxonomy to statistics and mathematical
tables enables a transition from deduction to induction. Individual
details, when observed en masse, can be assembled into an
understanding of the greater whole.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca reveal a more rhetorical stance
in their discussion of facts and truths. Indeed, they tend towards
social construction. For example, they claim that “it is not possible
[to]…classify this or that concrete datum as a fact” unless “we can
postulate uncontroverted, universal agreement with respect to it”
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 67). Of course, the authors
do not reject the existence of facts themselves, but rather point to
the ways that facts emerge amid the various forces of
argumentation and persuasion. In other words, speakers and
writers deploy facts that are much like the controversial concept of
the universal audience in that the “facts” we argue with are
constructions of our own making. This does not mean that basic
facts do not exist outside of our argumentation. For example, it is
fact that water freezes at zero degrees Celsius. But when I deploy
that fact in an argument, I rely on it as a construction of what I
assume my audience will grant as a fact. This must be so, because I
cannot actually know what my audience takes as fact.
In “Act and Person in Argument,” Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca provide an anecdote that makes clear the tenuousness of
even seemingly self-evident facts. They relate a tale from John
Locke that illustrates the extent to which well-accepted facts must
be accommodated to the audience:
It happened to a Dutch ambassador, who entertaining
the king of Siam with the peculiarities of
Holland…amongst other things told him “that the water
in his country would sometimes in cold weather be so
hard that men walked upon it, and that it would bear an
elephant if it were there.” To which the king replied
“hitherto I have believed the strange things you have told
Joshua Welsh
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me, because I look upon you as a sober, fair man: but
now I am sure you lie!” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca
1951, 263).
The Dutch ambassador wrongly assumed he was addressing a
universal audience as he explained the “fact” of water freezing.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca make it clear that the
relationship between the universal audience and rhetorical facts is
always an intimate one: “The way in which the universal audience is
thought of, and the incarnations of this audience that are
recognized, are thus determining factors in deciding what, in a
particular case, will be considered a fact” (Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca, 1969, p. 67). To put this in the proper context, it is crucial to
bear in mind that the universal audience as conceived by Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca is itself a construction of the author, thus
certainly any “concrete datum” held as fact by the audience must
also be a construction. 5 In this way, the emergence of facts can be
seen as the result of dialectical tension between the rhetor and the
audience. But since both speaker and listener are rhetorical
constructions, all of the tension is internal to the rhetor him or
herself.
However, this is not a process of arguing to determine what the
facts are. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca: “A fact loses
its status as soon as it is no longer used as a possible starting point,
but as the conclusion of an argumentation” (Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 68). Note that this flies in the face of
Aristotle’s observation that facts are not generally the subject of
arguments (Rhetoric 1.4, 1359a40-1359b2). As far as Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca are concerned, we most certainly can argue about
facts, but if we do, the facts lose their facticity. In this, Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca are much closer to Latour and Woolgar (1986,
see especially pages 151-186), who come to a similar conclusion
regarding the status of scientific facts. In other words, arguing
about what counts as a fact is not the same as arguing about the
facts of a particular case. The latter is simply an exercise in figuring
out which facts to pay attention to and which ones to ignore. The
former plays a role in determining whether a datum (e.g., the
freezing point of water or the number of planets in the solar system)
counts as a fact at all.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca divide those things that have
gained traction as facts into two groups: “Accepted facts may be
In this way the Universal Audience is just like any other audience (a
la Ong (1975)).
5
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either observed facts—this is perhaps the case for most premises—
or supposed, agreed facts, facts that are possible or probable”
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 68). The authors also
provide a helpful connection between facts and truths: “The term
‘facts’ is generally used to designate objects of precise limited
agreement, whereas the term ‘truths’ is preferably applied to more
complex systems relating to connections between facts” (68–9).
Thus even those things commonly understood as “Truths” in reality
are built on a foundation of context-specific rhetorical moves and
constructed audiences seen as universal by the speaker.

Locus 4: The Universal Audience
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s universal audience provides a
fourth theoretical place to aid in the creation of epistemic common
sense. The concept of the universal audience has long been
controversial. For example Ede criticizes the concept for its
apparent reliance on the rationality of the audience, while Gross
and Dearin dispute this weakness, since rationality, like the
universal audience itself, remains a construction of the speaker
(Ede 1989; Gross and Dearin 2003, 31-42). Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca claim that the universal audience
refers of course…not to an experientially proven fact, but
to a universality and unanimity imagined by the speaker,
the agreement of an audience which should be universal,
since, for legitimate reasons, we need not take into
considerations those which are not part of it (Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 31).
Clearly, this statement will ring critical alarm bells among postmodern readers. However, the concept of the universal audience
need not be read as a permission slip to exclude members from
audiences. Instead, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s project is a
twentieth century attempt to update notions and sensibilities drawn
from classical rhetoric; it seems unfair to criticize a modern project
for its inherent modernity.
More recently, Loïc Nicolas sees the relationship that the
universal audience creates between the speaker and his or her
constructed audience as a helpful point of transaction between
rhetoric and dialectic:
I believe that this idea [i.e., the Universal Audience]
gives meaning to the parallel between rhetoric and
dialectic. Addressing the universal audience amounts to
debating with oneself, that is, to undergo the necessary
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trial of contradiction and justification allowing for no
possible loophole” (Loïc Nicolas 2011, 52).
That said, it seems clear that the rhetorical concepts outlined above
rest on a foundation of perceived common sense. Indeed, one
function of rhetoric is to reinforce that very foundation.

Locus 5: Social Imaginaries
A fifth locus of change that helps us identify differences between
ancient and modern rhetoric offers an understanding of what
constitutes common sense that helps explain those aspects of the
social world that depend entirely on the belief and participation of
many individuals. This is the concept of social imaginaries put forth
by Charles Taylor. In “Modern Social Imaginaries,” Taylor suggests
a way of looking at the ways in which people see themselves
forming and taking part in society (2002). In Taylor’s words, a
social imaginary is “the ways in which people imagine their social
existence [and] how they fit in with others” (Taylor 2002, 100). It is
important to note that this notion is both normative and dialogic.
For example, Taylor suggests that the economy functions as a social
imaginary. The economy is normative in that everyone must
participate in some way—it is exceedingly difficult, if not
impossible, to opt out completely. However, the economy is also
affected by the actions and beliefs of all of the people that
participate in it.
Taylor provides numerous examples in his book-length
treatment of the topic, Modern Social Imaginaries (Taylor 2004).
For example, Taylor points to practices such as democratic elections
as relying on social imaginaries:
Part of the background understanding that makes sense
of our act of voting for each one of us is our awareness of
the whole action, involving all citizens, each choosing
individually but from among the same alternatives, and
the compounding of these microchoices into one
binding, collective decision (Taylor 2004, 24).
The validity of such choices relies on “our ability to identify what
would constitute a foul: certain kinds of influence, buying votes,
threats, and the like” (Taylor 2004, 24). In other words, the certain
norms must be met in order for the election to count as an election.
The same can be said of other kinds of collective action, such as
public demonstrations. Taylor argues that the very act of deciding
to demonstrate for or against something “means that this act is
already in our repertory. We know how to assemble, pick up
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banners, and march” (Taylor 2004, 26). Those participating in
something they know as a demonstration also have a sense of the
physical boundaries implicit in the action, as well as what kinds of
acts constitute a level of aggression that is too violent. In other
words, if a demonstration crosses certain thresholds of space and
violence, it ceases to be a demonstration and becomes something
else—perhaps a riot.
Taylor maintains that social imaginaries are different from
theories in that the former are “the [ways] ordinary people ‘imagine’
their social surroundings. … [This] is often not expresses in
theoretical terms; it is carried in images, stories, and legends”
(Taylor 2002, 100). Social imaginaries are necessarily “shared by
large groups of people, if not the whole society”; theories belong to
an elite few (106). Nevertheless, theories do inform social
imaginaries—by being taken up by other elites so that eventually
even whole societies may believe in a theory, to the extent that it
becomes part of “that common understanding that makes possible
common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy” (106).
Although Taylor does not attempt to tie these notions to rhetoric
in any explicit way, his focus on social imaginaries as informed by
images, stories, and legends clearly helps align social imaginaries
with rhetorical perspectives. For example, the “stories, images, and
legends” of Taylor’s social imaginaries are much the same as
Aristotle’s belief that human wisdom could be “preserved, if only
partially, in the form of sayings, maxims, and myths” (Haskins
2004, 6)—in other words, through endoxa. Note also that Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca point to similar means for creating the
communion that is crucial to epideictic rhetoric, a concept which I
discuss in greater detail below. Additionally, Taylor’s focus on the
practices of participants further strengthens the ties between social
imaginaries and rhetorical analysis.
It is worth noting that beyond simply being the stories we tell
ourselves about society, social imaginaries are normative at their
core. As Taylor puts it: “We have a common sense of how things
usually go, but this is interwoven with an idea of how they ought to
go” (Taylor 2002, 106). It is this aspect of telling us how things
ought to be that connects social imaginaries with enthymemes, as
demonstrated by Walton’s example of enthymeme (i.e., “If
something is served with a fork, and nobody eats soup with a fork,
then what was served is not a soup” [Walton 2001, 102]).
Another example can be drawn from a recent Canadian bill that
makes it illegal to wear a mask at a riot. As reported by the CBC,
this bill “bans the wearing of masks during a riot or unlawful
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assembly and carries a maximum 10-year prison sentence”
(Fitzpatrick 2013, n.p.). The Canadian Member of Parliament (MP)
who wrote the bill was cited as arguing that the measure would
protect the public. The MP also claimed that the bill did not infringe
upon civil liberties and would actually “help protect the legitimate
right to protest because it will help prevent legitimate protesters
from infiltrating a peaceful event and causing trouble” (Fitzpatrick
2013, n.p.). This position might be restated enthymematically, as
“People who wear masks at protests must have violent intent,
therefore we should not allow masks at protests.”
An advantage of the concept of social imaginaries is that it lacks
the ironclad inescapability of similar concepts such as ideology
especially as expressed by Louis Althusser (2001). Social
imaginaries as conceived by Taylor exhibit something of the quality
of dialectic itself. People shape the practices that shape them. In
this sense, social imaginaries such as the economy, democratic
elections, or popular demonstrations can be viewed in much the
same way as discourse itself.
Citing Anthony Giddens, Norman Fairclough calls this “the
notion of ‘duality of structure’ ” (Fairclough 2010, 38).
Furthermore, Fairclough urges researchers not to ignore critical
questions, since this means that power and status will also be
ignored. Additionally, “the absence of a serious concern with
explaining norms [will likewise result] in a neglect of power”
(Fairclough 2010, 48). That is, analysis based solely in description
will fall short of understanding the actions connected to and
resulted from the use of language. It will not be able to account for
the ethical implications of rhetoric. To guard against this neglect,
Fairclough suggests researchers look for ways in which discourse
shapes ideology. He calls such interactions between discourse and
ideology “ideological-discursive formations” (30). Ideologicaldiscursive formations (IDFs) work to “‘naturalize’ ideologies, i.e., to
win acceptance for them as non-ideological ‘common sense’ ” (30).
Fairclough further argues that “naturalized ideologies and practices
become part of the ‘knowledge base’…and hence the ‘orderliness’ of
interaction may depend on them” (Fairclough 2010, 37).
Furthermore, this “micro” orderliness in turn comes to depend on
“an achieved consensus in respect to ideological positions and
practices” (37). In other words, the small ways in which we
communicate perpetuate ideologies that are generated by social
groups or classes, but which appear to be due to human nature. In
essence, the relationship between ideology and discourse is
dialogic, and this relationship is created and maintained by IDFs.
Fairclough makes it clear that this duality applies to people as well
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as their ideologies: “In preferring ‘subject,’ I am emphasizing that
discourse makes people, as well as people make discourse” (41). 6
Therefore, despite being essentially normative, due to their
inherent dialogic nature, social imaginaries can be changed by the
words and practices of people that participate in them.
Finally, it is important to note that the Taylor’s social
imaginaries are essentially recursive. As Taylor puts it, “The social
imaginary is not a set of ideas; rather it is what enables, through
making sense of, the practices of society” (Taylor 2002, 91). An
example of this recursiveness can be found in Habermas’
description of the public sphere’s use of political power to write
constitutions to further stabilize its political power (Habermas
1991). Such documents re-inscribe themselves every time they are
obeyed. Christopher Kelty extends and explicates this concept of
recursiveness in his work on the practices that the free and open
source software community used to understand and enable itself
and its work (Kelty 2008). He describes a recursive public as “a
public constituted around the technical and moral ideas of order
that allow them to associate with one another” (Kelty 2008, 27). It
is important to note that for Kelty, a recursive public is more than a
community and the discourse it creates about itself. Kelty’s
definition insists on the inclusion of the technical structure that
enables the making and modification of the community itself (Kelty
2008, 50). The technical structures that enable systems of innovation such as the patent system or open source software would
thus fall under the purview of a recursively constituted social
imaginary. However, it is clear that such structures and any social
imaginaries they enable would amount to nothing without a
community of people to make use of and participate in them.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric offers the
concept of “rhetorical communion,” which is one way speakers and
writers participate in the creation and maintaining of the
communities that are a prerequisite for social imaginaries. Graff
and Winn provide a thorough analysis of this kind of communion
(as well as Kenneth Burke’s anticipatory notion of
“consubstantiality”). Graff and Winn make clear that the sense of
communion established by perhaps seemingly small instances of
epideictic language is essential to the forming and maintaining of
community:

6 Although Fairclough is concerned with analyzing discourse,
Berkenkotter and Huckin (1994) extend this concept to genre analysis.
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Acknowledging that every political community will
consist of individuals and groups with competing
interests and values, Perelman points to the sense of
Communion cultivated in epideictic discourses as the
factor that enables the community to confront or
transcend internal divisions that threaten to fracture it
(Graff and Winn 2011, 111).
Thus, communion is “in this its primary sense a…sociological
notion” carrying with it ideas of “shared values as a source of social
rapport and cohesion” that Perelman’s mentor Dupreel also held
dear (Graff and Winn 2011, 109).
In this sense, communion is also closely connected to less
rhetorical concepts such as solidarity:
The values promoted in any particular epideictic speech
are presumed to command the assent of the audience
addressed by the discourse, and as such, the discourse
fosters a sense of solidarity or communal spring among
the members of the audience who share those values
[citing The New Rhetoric, pp. 48–53]. ‘Communion’ is
the term Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca introduce to
name this solidarity” (Graff and Winn 2011, 109).
Graff and Winn argue that this is essentially a “constitutive
function for rhetoric,” in the sense described by Maurice Charland
(Graff and Winn 2011, 122; Charland 1987). Charland argues that a
constitutive approach to rhetoric creates implications for an
audience that are impossible in a theoretical approach focused on
persuasion. Persuasion as a theoretical cornerstone “implies the
existence of an agent who is free to be persuaded” (Charland 1987,
133). 7 Constitutive rhetoric on the other hand is concerned with the
role that rhetoric plays in creating audiences as such. In other
words, this is a rhetoric that a community uses to construct itself—
not just to convince or persuade itself or some of its members.
Although Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca see communion as
largely related to epideictic discourse, Graff and Winn argue that
epideictic itself can be oriented towards the future rather than
focusing solely on the present, as Aristotle would have it in The
Rhetoric (1.3,1358b16-20). As Graff and Winn put it: “Epideictic,
though celebrating values in the present, is oriented toward the
future. The Communion it fosters is anticipatory and preparatory”
(Graff and Winn 2011, 110).
Note that Charland relies on Burke’s Rhetoric of Motives for his
theoretical basis.
7
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Finally, Graff and Winn point to three major methods for
establishing communion, as described in The New Rhetoric:
1) Maxims and proverbs, which are centered on the values
of the audience;
2) Allusion and quotation, which are also focused on values;
3) Inviting the audience to participate, which Graff and
Winn suggest does not necessarily involve the values of
the audience (114).
For the third method, Graff and Winn point to methods such as the
oratorical question, but it is clear from the discussion of
enthymeme above that unstated premises or conclusions can also
be seen as an invitation to participate—especially in discursive
situations that do not involve direct interaction with the audience.
As noted, the first two methods rely on the supposed values of the
audience being addressed.

Common Sense and Technology in Aristotle
We have moved through five loci of change that mark shifts
between classical and modern epistemologies and how these
changes affect rhetorical theory. However, in order to answer
Fairclaugh’s challenge and move from description into critique, it is
necessary to look for the implications of these changes for the lives
of people. One result of this shift is the modern relationship that
people have with their technology. Later in this article, I will draw
largely from the work of philosopher Andrew Feenberg (2002). But
before moving to Feenberg’s critical theory, it is necessary to revisit
Aristotle once more in order to see how he himself dealt with the
imperfectly recognized historicity of the relationship between
technology and common sense. Following Lunsford and Ede’s
advice not to read The Rhetoric in isolation, I turn to the Politics to
explore this topic.
In Book I of the Politics, Aristotle provides a largely teleological
view of technology: “Everything is defined by its function and its
capacity, and if it is no longer the same in these respects, it should
not be spoken of in the same way, but only as something similarly
termed” (Aristotle Politics 1.3.1253a23-25). In other words, an
object can be defined by what it is supposed to do (its function) and
how well it does it (its capacity). Aristotle applies this teleological
definition of technology and to questions involving how and to what
degree technology supports existing social structures.
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In fact Aristotle saw clearly the potential new technology had to
upset one of the social institutions that enabled his society to
function: slavery.
Every subordinate, moreover, is an instrument that
wields many instruments, for if each of the instruments
were able to perform its function on command or by
anticipation, as they assert those of Daedalus did, or the
tripods of Hephaestus (which as the poet says “of their
own accord came to the gods’ gathering”), so that
shuttles would weave themselves and picks play the lyre,
master craftsmen would no longer have need for
subordinates, or masters for slaves (Aristotle Politics
1.4.1253a32-1254a1).
Note that from Aristotle’s point of view, the idea of automatic
machines that could free slaves from their toil was dystopic; he
believed that most slaves were slaves because it was in their
essential nature to be slaves: “That same persons are free and
others slaves by nature, therefore, and that for these [i.e., those who
are slaves by nature] slavery is both advantageous and just, is
evident” (Politics 1.6.1255a1-3). In other words, since slavery is an
essential role for some people, machines that eliminate the need for
those slaves would take away an essential part of their being. For
Aristotle it was literally common sense to limit the incursions of
technology into society.
Compare now Aristotle’s vision of technology run amok with
Langdon Winner’s Autonomous Technology (Winner 1978). Like
Aristotle, Winner was concerned with the consequences of a
technological world that was becoming more and more automated.
The result of automation in Winner’s account would be to make
humans subject to technology. As divergent as these two visions of
autonomous technology are, they are the same in a crucial way:
Both are concerned with the social ramifications that come along
with technological advancement. However, whereas Aristotle
worried that large-scale technological innovation would free the
slaves, Winner’s concern is that technology is making slaves of us
all.
Feenburg’s critical theory of technology recommends itself, in
the first instance, because of how it deals with this question.
Although he would obviously disagree with Aristotle’s conclusions
regarding technology and slavery, Feenberg does take a similar
methodological approach to Aristotle; both offer a teleological
approach to technology. For Feenberg this approach stems from the
need to “[distinguish] between the critique of natural science and
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the critique of technology” (Feenberg 2002, 174). To help make this
distinction clear, Feenberg suggests investigating the outcomes of
technology. By taking a teleological approach to the impacts that
technologies have on people, communities, and the environment,
one can apply a critical lens to technology. In the following section,
I argue that rhetoric provides one entryway into such a critical
approach to technology.

Changes in the Relationship between Rhetoric
and Technology
I have discussed five loci of change in the pages above. I argue that
these changes illustrate a shift in the relationship between rhetoric
and truth. More recently, these loci have helped reveal the nature
of the range of possible relationships between humans and technology. In this section I hope to shed further light on this
relationship. Some definitions of technology enable us to see the
relation between common sense and technology clearly, while
others obscure it. I find helpful those definitions that also show how
rhetoric figures in mediating the relationship between common
sense and technology. I will proceed by attempting the deceptively
difficult exercise of defining technology and by examining
Feenberg’s critical theory of technology in particular.
An Excursion Defining Technology If any attempt to flesh out the
relationship between rhetoric and technology is to be successful, it
is necessary to define the term “technology.” In the age of smart
phones and tablet computers, it may be tempting to think of
technology as nothing more than the shiny device with a bright
screen that you hold in your hand and use to post pictures of your
dog to Facebook. However, even this tongue-in-cheek example
points to greater complexity. The actual device you hold can do
nothing without a long history of software development, systems
and networks of mineral extraction to provide cobalt for the battery,
and vastly complex interactions between telephone networks and
the Internet—and this just scratches the surface of the social and
technical systems required to make these devices work. Below I
attempt to construct a working definition for technology that
respects this complexity from a number of diverse scholars.
Thomas Hughes sees technology as a “creative process involving
human ingenuity” (Hughes 2004, 3), and later as a “creative means
to a variety of ends” (5). In other words, technology is the way
humans deal with the material world. By focusing on the ends of
technology, Hughes makes it clear that technology cannot be considered in isolation from the effects that it has on the social and
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material worlds—on people and the environment. By way of
comparison, Winner views technology as composed of a variety of
sub-components. In this definition, technologies can be broken
down into apparatuses such as individual tools or weapons,
techniques (that is, skills, crafts and other human activities),
organizations, which Winner defines as technological social
arrangements, and networks, that is, “large scale systems[s] that
[combine] people and apparatuses linked across distances” (Winner
1978, 12). Like Winner, Hughes notes that machines can be
connected into systems, but adds that systematization is often
thought of as a dehumanizing force—think urban planning—while
networks denote hope and human connections—think Vannevar
Bush’s vision for the Memex device (Hughes 2004, 97).
To help shed light on the difference between a technology and a
machine, it is useful to turn to Bruno Latour and Lewis Mumford.
Latour describes a machine as a device that holds otherwise
disparate forces together: “This makes a machine different from a
tool which is a single element held directly in the hand of a man or a
woman. Useful as tools are they never turn Mr or Mrs Anybody into
Mr or Mrs Manybodies!” (Latour 1987, 129). Similarly, Mumford
claims that the first machine was the bow and arrow, which is the
first human-made device to do more than simply extend the
function of an existing organ (such as a club extending the function
and force available in the naked human hand). Mumford also
describes the systems of human capital and control used to build
the pyramids as a “megamachine,” which he justifies as more than
just an “idle play on words” (Mumford 1967, 191). “If a machine be
defined…as a combination of resistant parts, each specialized in
function, operating under human control, to utilize energy and to
perform work, then the great labor machine was in every respect a
genuine machine” (191).
Feminist scholars such as Judy Wajcman point to the intrinsic
connection between technology and human knowledge in order to
show eventually how gendered technology has always been:
“technology” is a form of knowledge….Technological
“things” are meaningless without the “know-how” to use
them. That know-how often cannot be captured in
words. It is visual, even tactile, rather than simply verbal
or mathematical. But it can also be systemized and
taught, as in the various disciplines of engineering
(Wajcman 1991, 14).
Wajcman notes the close connection between technology and
action: “‘Technology’ also refers to what people do as well as what
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they know…. A computer without programs and programmers is
simply a useless collection of bits of metal, plastic and silicon” (14–
15).
Wajcman further describes the realm of technology as one that
has traditionally been dominated by men and as a result by male
values: “As with science, the very language of technology, its
symbolism, is masculine. It is not simply a question of acquiring
skills, because these skills are embedded in a culture of masculinity
that is largely coterminous with the culture of technology”
(Wajcman 1991, 19). Wajcman is concerned with barriers that have
prevented women from participating in the creation, shaping and
steering of technology. However, she notes that mere access is no
solution, due to fundamental disconnects between technology that
has been dominated by male values and the potential for a truly
‘feminist’ technology—one that sees an elimination of patriarchy as
an engineering goal of technology itself. In this sense, a feminist
approach to technology would likely resemble the technological
holism described by Feenberg (2002). Wajcman’s insight is quite
clear, especially in light of a rhetorical dispute such as “The Patent
Wars”—the very label implies contestation and violence as well as a
set of shared values and beliefs, set against technological and
economic systems that favor “winners” over “losers” and tend to
disregard value systems that do not align well with this perspective.
Taking into account all of these sources, I offer the following
definition of technology:
Systems that involve creative combinations of tools, machines,
processes, and/or people that are connected by networks with the
purpose of making, creating, or changing things in the social and
material worlds.
By combining the devices with their effects on the world, this
definition calls for ethical considerations of technology. By this I
mean that technology cannot be seen as an ethically neutral tool. As
I have argued above rhetoric and technology have always been
closely connected, even if people have not always seen those
connections. But there also exists a rhetoric of technology. Charles
Bazerman offers the following definition for this concept:
[A rhetoric of technology] is the rhetoric that
accompanies technology and makes it possible—the
rhetoric that makes technology fit into the world and
makes the world fit with technology. There is a dialectic
between rhetoric and the material design as the
technology is made to fit the imaginably useful and
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valuable, to fit into people’s understanding of the world
(Bazerman 1998, 385).
Bazerman’s definition highlights once more the close, two-way
relationship between rhetoric and technology—dialectic in
Aristotle’s terms, duality of structure in Fairclough’s or Taylor’s. By
paving a road between people and technology, rhetoric plays an
important role in transferring human values into technological
creations and vice versa.
Values and Technology Technology is imbued with the values of
the people that create it. Feminist scholars of technology have been
aware of this for some time. For example, Wajcman discusses the
technological architecture of the home as one that “uniquely
revealing about prevailing social relations and norms of household
organization” (Wajcman 1991, 110). The Victorian desire for a
separation of the sexes and privacy (especially for the ‘Master’ of
the house) gave way to more open architecture that—at least in
theory—implied families that would share in the work of the home.
Wajcman describes similar instances of values being laden into
urban transportation infrastructure that favors the (traditionally)
male bread-winner and his commute to work (pp. 126–135).
Similarly, in her investigation into the absence of women from
historical accounts of technical writing, Katherine Durack (1997)
points to a crucial misstep in the way previous histories have viewed
technology and women:
The problem with regard to adding women to our
disciplinary history lies in the assumption that
technology, work, and workplace are gender-neutral
terms. … But as the work of feminist historians and
scholars demonstrate, such terms represent contested
ground (Durack 1997, 250).
It is in these areas of contestation that values become embedded in
technology.
Similarly, values are being designed into the size, shape, and
design of mobile technologies. 8 Addressing such values is the
central task that Feenberg (2002) has set out for himself. In the rest
of this section, I outline three of Feenberg’s core concepts:
instrumentalism (which is essentially the notion that technology is

For example, it seems an unlikely coincidence that the size and shape
of a cell phone is about the same size and shape as a man’s billfold—a
form factor that potentially trades ease of use in order to easily fit in a
pocket.
8
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a neutral tool), substantivism (often described as technological
determinism), and Feenberg’s own critical theory.
The Instrumental Theory of Technology and Values Instrumental
theory is the belief that technologies are nothing more than neutral
tools, which people use to do whatever they will. Andrew Feenberg
argues that this common-sense approach is the “most-widely
accepted view of technology” (Feenberg 2002, 5). Furthermore,
Feenberg argues that instrumentalism rests on the following five
assumptions:
1)

Technology is neutral in the same way that any
“instrumental means” is neutral, and that technology is
“indifferent to the variety of ends” it can be directed
towards (2002, 5).

2)

In addition to being indifferent to its outcomes,
“technology…appears to be indifferent with respect to
politics” (6). That is, discussions regarding the public
good have little or no bearing on discussions of technological progress. The only place where the barrier
between politics and technology is permeable involves
discussions of cost.

3)

Technology is deemed neutral because of its “‘rational’
character” (6). In other words, since science is seen as the
product of a rational process, uncovering knowable things
about the material world, technology—which is science
applied to the material world—must also be neutral.

4)

Technology is deemed neutral because of its “‘rational’
character” (6). In other words, since science is seen as the
product of a rational process, uncovering knowable things
about the material world, technology—which is science
applied to the material world—must also be neutral.

5)

Technology is seen as neutral because it “stands
essentially under the very same norms of efficiency in any
and every context” (6). If the focus is on measurements of
efficiency, other ways of evaluating the effects of
technology drop to the wayside. Social, cultural, and
environmental costs (and benefits) are much harder to
measure in terms of efficiency.

Although Feenberg’s five points give an extremely helpful analysis
of an instrumental view of technology, I believe that
instrumentalism’s most defining (and most insidious) feature is its
connection to self-evidence or common sense. Instrumentalism is at
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the heart of slogans such as “Guns don’t kill people; people kill
people.” While this is true, it is also true that people build guns that
kill other people. Instrumentalism makes it all too easy to gloss over
this.
The Substantive Theory of the Technology and Values Substantive
theory, on the other hand, places agency in technology itself: “Substantive theory…argues that technology constitutes a new cultural
system that restructures the entire social world as an object of
control” (Feenberg 2002, 6–7). Under substantivism, technology
becomes more than one cultural factor among many that define the
course of human development—it becomes the most important
factor. The illogical but often fantasized conclusion of this argument
is that technology will become autonomous and will ultimately
control people as the means to fulfill its (i.e., technology’s) own
ends. Nightmarish scenes from any number of science fiction
movies have envisioned the results.
A less imaginative but more realistic version of this theory can
be found in Autonomous Technology, in which Winner describes
the current state of Western technology as a conduit, “such that no
matter which aims or purpose we decide to put in, a particular kind
of product inevitably comes out” (Winner 1978, 278). Feenberg
offers a relatively mundane example as illustration: As fast food has
replaced the nightly practice of sitting down with family for dinner,
“the unity of the family, ritually affirmed each evening, no longer
has a comparable locus of expression” (2002, 7). This is not to say
that fast food causes a decline in family life, but the correlation and
mutual interaction between the two factors (that is, the rise of a
technologically-based daily life and the simultaneous decline in
family life) is significant. Feenberg reiterates that the substantive
theory does not necessarily consider technology as run amok: “The
issue is not that machines have ‘taken over,’ but that in choosing to
use them, we make many unwitting commitments” (2002, 7). These
commitments add up, amounting to a kind of technological
determinism, in which technology determines the shape of society
(and not the other way around).
Interestingly, there is a measure of ‘common-sense’ in
substantive theory as well—when people speak of ‘the march of
progress,’ they are often invoking a substantive view of technology.
The implication is that technology will move forward in the
direction that it has chosen, and people can only follow along or get
out of the way.
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Feenberg’s Critical Theory of Technology and Values Feenberg’s
critical theory of technology requires that technology be thought of
not as a thing, but rather as “an ‘ambivalent’ process of
development suspended between different possibilities” (Feenberg
2002, 15). It is important to note that this ambivalence is not the
same thing as neutrality: “This ambivalence of technology is
distinguished from neutrality by the role is attributes to social
values in the design, and not merely the use of, technological
systems” (Feenberg 2002, 15). Note that this definition of
technology is similar to the definition offered by Hughes who sees
technology as a “creative process involving human ingenuity” and
as a “creative means to a variety of ends” (Hughes 2004, 3, 5). The
key parts of these two definitions overlap; technology is a process
aimed at ‘ends’ in Hughes’ definition and at ‘possibilities’ in
Feenberg’s. The goal of critical theory is to carefully deconstruct
and evaluate technology and its relationship to those
ends/possibilities, under the assumption that technology is a
cultural construct shaped by the values and attitudes of the people
that create it. Feenberg summarizes this relationship nicely:
“Technology is a two-sided phenomenon: on the one hand, there is
the operator, on the other, the object. Where both operator and
object are human beings, technical action is an exercise of power”
(16). By considering roles that technology plays in reconstituting
relationships among people and things, Feenberg’s theory makes it
possible to account for the social and cultural values involved in the
production of technology.

Conclusion
Aristotle’s descriptions of endoxa and enthymeme, as well as
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s notions of community and the
Universal Audience, provide a solid foundation for understanding
how rhetoric and texts work to create an aura of common sense.
That common sense includes our understanding of technology. The
philosophical work of Taylor and Feenberg provides helpful tools
for teasing out the ways in which technology becomes “naturalized”
into our lives—how it becomes invisible. This apparent invisibility
arises not from anything inherent in the technology itself, but from
the rhetoric of that technology—and how that rhetoric works to
accommodate people to the technology. Indeed, in many ways,
creating a sense of what is common is what rhetoric is all about.
Only modern rhetorical theorists could have seen this. Aristotle
could not.
Copyright © 2013 Joshua Welsh
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